The idea of market panics spreading through social contagion-where individuals hear some bad news and communicate it to their acquaintances, who pass it on in turn. leading to a market panic-goes back at least to David Ricardo (1951 p. 68) , who attributed the panic leading to the suspension of convertibility in 1797 to "the contagion of the unfounded fears of the timid part of the community." While suggestive evidence for the importance of networks of personal contact in financial markets is provided by the survey data of Robert J. Shiller {1989 Chs. 1-2), Shiller and John Pound (1989) , and Ellen Hertz's (1998) fascinating ethnographic study of investor groups in the Shanghai stock boom of 1992. a forma! test of market contagion requires not only information on the transactions of individual participants, but also a knowledge of their information networks, something hitherto unavailable for financial markets.'
To test the role of social contagion in market panics, this paper looks at the behavior of depositors in a New York bank, the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, during two bank runs in the l850's. We can reconstruct the social networks of these depositors with some confidence because of one fact about them: most were recent immigrants from Ireland.
The classic pattern of migration is that newly arrived immigrants move in near people they knew in their home country." As a recent immigrant, one's social network in the new world is determined in large part by where one came from in the old. We confirm that social networks reflect place of origin by using marriage records from a church located close to the bank. Of Irish couples married there in the 185O's. a majority had come from the same county, and very often the same parish, in Ireland; and frequently inhabited the same tenement in New York. Consequently, if a depositor had emigrated from County Cork in Ireland, we can be quite confident that he knew other depositors from Cork.
After taking account of the individual characteristics of depositors and their account histories, we test how well social-network variables-county of origin and district of residence-distinguish depositors who closed their accounts during each panic from those who stayed with the bank. We use a classificationtree procedure that recursively partitions the set of depositors into increasingly homogeneous groups of panickers and stayers.
The results obtained are striking. While factors such as length of time the account had been open. nil years lived in the United States, and size of account have some role in predicting behavior, the most important characteristic that distinguishes panickers from stayers is county of origin in Ireland. Depositors from one set of counties tended to close their accounts in both panics, while otherwise identical individuals from other counties tended to stay with the bank. County of origin also determines, in the more important run, the timing of panicking: different groups of depositors closed their accounts at different times. The importance of county of origin in determining behavior does not diminish the longer the depositor had lived in America, reflecting the well-known failure of these, mostly very poor, immigrants to assimilate into wider New York society.
Bank panics are the product of observable events that are perceived by depositors to contain adverse information about a bank's solvency. They can be the result of a sequence of stochastic withdrawals (Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig, 1983) . or of asymmetric information between the bank and its depositors about the quality of the bank's assets (V. V. Chari and Ravi Jagannathan. 1988) .'' What matters is that a few depositors decide for some reason that the bank is in trouble and start to pass the news on to their acquaintances.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section I gives the historical background to the paper, discussing the bank, Irish immigrants in New York, and the panics of 1854 and 1857. Our data are summarized in Section II, and Section III tests the importance of social networks relative to individual characteristics in distinguishing depositors who panicked from those who stayed put. Section IV concludes.
Historical Background

A. Bank
The Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank (EISB) was one of a score of mutual savings
•' A useful survey of the causes of panics is given by Charles W. Calomiris and Gary Gorton (1991) . Our concern here is with contagion among depositors, rather than the contagion among lenders considered by Guillermo Calvo and Enrique Mendoza (1995) , Jeffrey Sachs et al. (1995) , and others. The role of bank solvency in propagating panics is examined by Calomiri.s and Joseph R. Mason (1997). banks set up in New York Stale before the Civil War. These banks, established to offer high interest and liquidity to the industrious poor, proved extremely popular: in New York City by 1860 there wa.s one savings bank account for every four people (Alan L. Olmstead, 1976 p. 4) . For good economic histories of the early savings banks, see Peter L. Payne and Lance E. Davis (1956) on Baltimore, and Olmstead (1976) on New York City.
The EISB was set up on Chambers Street in the Sixth Ward by a group of prominent Irish citizens, acting at the behest of the ubiquitous Bishop John Hughes of New York, in September 1850. Its first depositors were overwhelmingly Irish immigrants and, although it attracted increasing numbers of German immigrants and Irish-Americans, this group still held almost 90 percent of accounts in the late 185O's. By 1860 it had over 10,000 accounts and held over $2 million on deposit, making it a medium-sized savings bank by contemporary standards (Olmstead, 1976 p. 159) .
What makes this bank notable is the large amount of background information on individual depositors that it collected, which makes its archive a primary source of information about Irish immigrants to America in the immediate post-Famine period.* For example, the bank's first depositor, Bridget White, was the wife of a tailor living on Henry Street in the Seventh Ward. Bom near Mountmellick in Queens County, Ireland, she had arrived in New York nine years earlier on the Eairfield out of Liverpool. Her father still lived in Ireland, but her mother was dead. She had four brothers (whose names are given), three of them living in the United States, and three sisters.
The patterns of account holding in the bank are discussed in 6 Grada and Eugene White (1999) and summarized below in Table 3 . While some account holders behaved in true Smilesian fashion, making small deposits and allowing them to accumulate, and others made frequent deposits and withdrawals, treating their accounts almost as checking accounts; in most cases, as George Alter et al. (1994) found for the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society in 1850, accounts were relatively large in size, brief in duration, and inactive.
B. People
The EISB was located in the greatest concentration of Irish immigrants in North America. New York was the main port of entry into the United States for Irish immigrants and, by the mid-1850's, contained almost as many Irishbom people as Dublin. Like immigrants everywhere, the Irish tended to cluster in neighborhoods of their own. In New York in 1855, Irish immigrants accounted for 28.2 percent of the city's population but made up over two-fifths of the populations of the First, Foutih, and Sixth Wards. Immigrants from different parts of Ireland tended to cluster in distinct enclaves; Monroe Street was known as "Cork Row," in the Fourth Ward the area next to the East River was "a favorable spot for Kerry men and their descendants," and so on (John T. Ridge, 1996 pp. 276-77) . The EISB was located in the Sixth Ward next to streets teeming with impoverished immigrants from Counties Kerry and Sligo.
Marriage patterns reflect social networks, and the importance of regional and local networks for Irish immigrants is demonstrated by the marriage records of a Roman Catholic Church located a few hundred yards from the EISB, the Church of the Transfiguration of Our Lord.^ As Table I shows, in the period 1853 to 1860, most Irish couples who married there had come from the same or neighboring county in Ireland. Among men originating from the wellrepresented counties of Kerry and Sligo, more than two-thirds married women from the same county and, in most cases, from the same corner of the same county. Ten of the 15 grooms from Tuosist parish in Kerry married women from the same parish, and three more women from neighboring parishes. Eleven of the 29 grooms from the parish of Rahamlish in Sligo married women from Rahamlish, and another four married women from a neighboring parish.
Certain Sixth Ward addresses recur in the marriage records. For instance, thirteen men, mostly ' These records are discussed in more detail in 0 Grada (1999 pp. 114-21) . 
C. The Panics of 1854 and J857
Our purpose is to examine how these immigrants behaved during two bank panics: a small run in 1854, and the major Panic of 1857. The 1854 run began on December 12 with the news that, for the second week running, the Knickerbocker Bank (parent of the Knickerbocker Savings Bank, the only New York savings bank to fail in the antebellum era) had not produced a weekly statement for the New York bankers' clearinghouse (Olmstead, 1976 pp. 142-43) . On December 13 several savings banks were forced to pay out freely, and on the following day the Bank of Savings on Chambers Street sent $200,000 of its government paper to Washington for redemption. The news reduced the demand for deposits but, although the city's press was unanimous in denouncing the gullibility of those involved in the run and repeatedly urged that the city's other savings banks were sound, banks continued to experience high rates of account closure until December 30. New York's savings Institutions were far more seriously affected in 1857 than they had been in 1854. Although the press and the financial establishment were dismissive of the fears of the crowds who gathered around banks, the declines in railway stock and state and municipal bonds were such as to threaten the solvency of at least some of the banks (6 Grada and White, 1999) . For several days thousands of account holders lined up to withdraw most or all of their savings. On October 13 the savings banks invoked a rarely imposed clause in their articles of agreement limiting withdrawals on demand to 10 percent of the outstanding balance, and brought the panic to a close. Between September 28 and October 13, 1857 over 500 EISB savers closed their accounts, nearly twofifths of them on October 12 and 13 alone.
II. Data and Estimation
We consider the behavior of depositors during the panics of 1854 and 1857. Based on our earlier discussion, we date the 1854 panic as the period December 11 to December 30, and the 1857 panic as the period September 28 to October 13. These two events show clearly as spikes in the monthly series of changes in the number of EISB accounts (closures minus openings) in Figure I . A depositor is defined as a panicker if he closed his account during these periods. A possible limitation of this detinition is that it excludes depositors who removed most of their money while keeping their account
open. However, given the frequency with which depositors closed accounts, and the low time cost of reopening an account, this is probably not important. The relatively short duration of both panics reduces the force of a second limitation, that our "panickers" include some depositors who would have closed their accounts in any case.
For each period, our sample consists of all panickers and a one in ten sample of other depositors who decided not to close their accounts. This led to an initial sample of 598 accounts for 1854, of which 235 were closed during the panic; and 1,035 accounts, including 505 panickers, for 1857. Note that only a small proportion of depositors (6 percent in 1854 and 8.7 percent in 1857) closed their accounts on each occasion.F or each depositor we recorded the date the account was opened, the number of deposits and withdrawals made prior to the panic, and the closing balance of the account (or its balance at the end of the panic, if the account stayed open). As well as this account information, we collected information about the personal details of
•"The sample size was dictated by ihe need to calculate individual-iiccounl details from handwrilten bank ledgers. Varying ihe proportion of nonpanicker:! sampled changes the reported sample probabilities of panicking bui does not affeci the relative significance of explanatory variables. depositors: their sex, occupation, how long they had been living in the United States, atid, most importantly, their social networks. As the marriage data discussed above demonstrated, the social networks of Irish immigrants reflected two interrelated facts about their lives: where they had come from in Ireland, and where they lived in New York. We have data on both factors: we know the province and county of origin of most Irish depositors, and the street addresses of all depositors.
To convert street addresses into district codes we use the street grid of Humphrey Phelps's "New York City Street and Avenue Guide" in Phelps (1857) (see Figure 2) . This assigned the city into grids about 1,000 yards square (approximately 11 north-south blocks by 4 east-west blocks).^ Streets in row F below 14th Street are grouped together as Downtown, the area between 14th Street and 32nd Street we label Midtown, and the remainder of Manhattan as Uptown. Our ' Some longer streets span more than one grid square but are assigned by Phelps to one, so some depositors on these streets will have been assigned to the wrong square. Other districts are Brooklyn, Long Island, Staten Island, New Jersey, Upstate, and other. As well as capturing potential neighborhood effects, this grid allows us to gauge the impact of shoe-leather costs on panicking: depositors living in squares closer to the bank face a lower cost of going to the bank and closing their accounts and may therefore be more likely to panic.R estricting ourselves to Irish depositors whose county of origin is known, and whose address we could locate, gave us a sample of 439 accounts, including 193 panickers, for 1854: and 766 accounts, including 399 panickers. for 1857. The variables that we use to distinguish between panickers and stayers are defined in Table 2 , and summary statistics are presented in Table 3 .
There are several notable features about the
We are grateful to a referee for this point.
depositors summarized in . Density is the mean of the logistic density estimated for each observation, adjusted for the undersampling of stayers: multiplying the coefficient of a numerical variables by this gives the marginal effect of the variahle on the probability of panicking. Null deviance and residual deviance are minus twice the log-likelihood (up to a constant) when only the intercept is included, and when all explanatory variables are included respectively. Percent misclassified is the percentage ot observations where the predicied value of the dependent variable differs from the actual value. * Denotes pseudo-l-statistic significant at 5 percent. ** Denotes pseudo-(-statistic significant at I percent. differences are in size of deposit and length of time in America: the larger one's account and the longer one had lived in the United States the less likely one was to panic. Province of origin also mattered, with depositors from Ulster underrepresented among panickers relative to other provinces. This informal division is supported by logistic regressions for the probability of panicking reported in Table 4 . The regression coefficients reflect the behavior of the sample where panickers are overrepresented. Up is the fraction of our sample that panicked, then p/(\0 -9p) is the fraction of the bank's depositors that panicked. To estimate the marginal effect of a numerical variable on the true probability of panicking for an individual at the mean level of the covariates, these coefficients are multiplied by the figure in the row labeled "Density," which is the logistic multiplier times the derivative ofthe population probability of panicking. The undersampling of stayers implies that this adjustment factor is substantial, in the range 0.06 to 0.08.
In both 1854 and 1857 the probability of panicking declines the longer one had lived in the United States and had been with the bank, the larger one's account balance, and if one came from Ulster. Holding other covariates fixed at their mean values, and again adjusting for the fact that only one in ten stayers were sampled, a depositor from Ulster has a predicted probability of panicking of 3 percent in 1854 and 5 percent in 1857, only half that of a depositor from Leinster (the omitted province in the regression dummies), whose predicted probabilities are 8 percent and 10 percent respectively. In addition, depositor's occupation is significant for 1854, while sex is significant for 1857.
The importance of networks of personal acquaintance in propagating panics can be seen in the day to day accounts of the bank. During the 1854 run, for instance, we find that John Hayes and John Lane {originally from Cork) and Thomas Murray and Michael Corcoran (from Roscommon). all laborers living at 26 Cherry Street, showed up at the bank on September 14 and closed their accounts. Table 5 shows that there is a large variation in the likelihood of panicking across different counties of origin. In 1857, for example, while 52 percent of accounts in our sample closed during the panic, only 17 percent of depositors originally from Donegal and 26 percent from Cavan (both Ulster counties) panicked, compared with 67 percent for Meath and 74 percent for Kerry. The hypothesis that these proportions are equal across counties is strongly rejected: the chi-squared statistic is 52.4 for 1854 and 74.6 for 1857, both significant at I percent. It can be seen that the same counties tended to produce panickers or stayers in both years: the rank-order correlation between percentage of panickers in both years is 0.55. county of origin in Ireland. Neglecting counties with few depositors, it shows not only a strong variation in the probability of panicking, but also that the counties least likely to produce panickers are clustered in the north and northwest of the county. When county-of-origin dummies were added to the regressions in the first two columns of Table 4 , only Galway and Wexford in 1854 were individually significant. However, the county dummies are jointly strongly significant: the chi-squared statistic for the hypothesis that their coefficients are jointly zero is 54 for 1854 and 72 for 1857. Using district-of-residence instead of county-of-origin dummies, districts 4d and 4e were individually significant in 1854, and district 4b in 1857. Testing joint significance of all districts gave a borderline significant chi-squared statistic of 30 for 1854, but a highly significant 43 for 1857. If county of origin is already included, the district-ofresidence dummies are jointly insignificant for 1854, but significant at 2 percent for 1857. While these results suggest that social network factors may play an important role in panics, we need a technique that can handle factors with many levels, and possible nonlinear interactions between explanatory variables, more economically than a logistic regression.
III. Social Networks in Panics
To examine the importance of social networks in propagating panics, an elegant and intuitive approach is provided by the classification-tree procedure of L. Breiman et al. (1984) .Ĉ lassification trees use a recursive, binary partitioning procedure to split the data into groups of observations that are as homogeneous as possible in terms of the dependent variable.
The procedure goes through all explanatory variables and tries a split at each level for every numerical variable, and for every combination of levels for each factor. It chooses the split that partitions the data into panickers and stayers with as few misclassifications of individuals as possible. For instance, an account balance of $60 might provide the best split, with depositors holding less than this tending to panic and those with more tending to stay. The procedure is then repeated for each of the two new subgroups of data, with the algorithm again searching through the explanatory variables to find the best partition in each case. For example, among depositors with a balance of less than $60, district of residence niight give the best split, with depositors from districts 4c and 4d tending to panic and those from other districts tending to stay; while for depositors with balances above $60, length of time in the United States might give the best partition, with those present more than five years being inclined to stay and a majority of those present less than five years panicking. This partitioning process continues until the process runs out of observations. Splits higher in the tree are more important in terms of distinguishing panickers from stayers than splits lower down. The result is a decision tree that gives a rule for classifying each individual, and states the probability that an individual is misclassified by this rule. A typical decision path might be, for example, that an individual with less than $60 in the bank, who lived in districts 4c or 4d, and was an unskilled workers is predicted to he a panicker; and of the 12 individuals in the sample that fit this description, 4 are incorrectly classified as panickers.
The 32 levels of the county factor lead to over two billion possible splits that must be evaluated, making the algorithm impossibly slow. We therefore omitted depositors from the four counties with the fewest accounts in each year. This allowed the algorithm used to run in a reasonable time, and reduced the chance of results being distorted by a factor level corresponding to a handful of observations. This gave 420 observations for 1854 and 738 for 1857.
The results of the classification procedure for 1854 and 1857, estimated using the S-Plus package, are presented in Figures 4 and 5 . The interpretation of these figures is straightforward. The value at each node, I or 0, tells whether the majority of depositors at that node were panickers {1) or stayers (0). The number alb below the node gives the number of misclassified observations a as a fraction of the total number of observations at the node b. Looking at the left-most path of Figure  4 , for instance, we can see that of 102 depositors who came from AnUim, Cavan, Clare, Derry, Donegal, Monaghan, Sligo, and Tyrone, only 23 panicked; and of the 7 depositors from these counties who had been with the bank for less than 2.1 months, all but one panicked.
The pattern of results in Figures 4 and 5 is immediate and striking. For both panics, the most important factor that distinguishes panickers from stayers is county of origin. In both 1854 and 1857, depositors from Cavan, Donegal, Monaghan, Tyrone, and Sligo tended to stay while depositors from other counties tended to panic. Among depositors from staying counties, three-quarters stayed with the bank in 1854, and two-thirds in 1857-For these depositors, the length of time with the bank (1854) and the size of their balance {1857) have a secondary effect in reducing the risk of panicking.
Among depositors from other counties, slightly over half those in the sample panicked in 1854 and 60 percent in 1857. In both years, the most important secondary characteristic of panickers is length of time in the United States: of 23 depositors in 1854 who had been there more than 18 years, only 3 panicked; while in 1857 more than two-thirds of depositors who had lived less than 8 years in the United States panicked. After this, the most important characteristic is district of residence for 1854. with depositors from the contiguous blocks 4c, 4d, 4e, and 5d likely to panic (these blocks lie close to the bank, which is located in 4c, suggesting a possible role for shoe-leather costs, although this effect is probably mitigated by the small size of the city at the time); and in 1857 it is number of months with the bank.
These results are highly robust; using any large subset of the data in each year gave rise to the same pattern of partitions.'" The most important assurance of robustness is the similarity of the trees generated in each year.
The parsimony of the classification tree is apparent. Using only the first two layers of the tree, 63 percent of depositors are correctly classified in 1854, and 65 percent in 1857, and this '" A referee raised the possibility that the large number of levels of the county factor could generate a spurious importance for that variable. If depositors are assigned a county al random, county does appear occasionally as high as the second or third split variable in a tree. In ihis case, however, the generated trees were nonrobust: using different subsets of each year's data generated different patterns of splits by county, and the county partitions were very different for each year. That a large number of levels need not generate classiticatory power is shown by ihe district of residence variable, with 23 levels, which does not appear high in any tree, even when the county variable is omitted. countyiant.cav.da.der.dcHi.mon.sli.tvr county:arm,cor,clow,dub.gal,ker.ldd,klk.lao,lei,lirn,lori,may,mea,off,r(}S,tip,wal Note: The number in each node denotes whether the majority of depositors there are panickers (1) or stayers (0); the fraction beneath the node detiotes the proportion of depositors that are misclassified at the node.
rises to 67 and 68 percent respectively if the next layer of the tree is added. This is similar to the misclassification rates obtained from the logits in Table 4 .
Classification trees continue to partition data until they run out of observations, resulting in overfitting. To prune the fitted tree, two approaches are available. The first is to split the data county:arm, cav, don, kld, klk, lon.mon, sli, :yr, wal ounty :cla, cof, der, club, lor, gal, ker, lao, lei, lim, lou, niay, mea, of(, ros, tip, wes, wex years.ln.us<7.5 years.in.us>7.5 length, open <21.85* lenglh, open>2i.85 lenglh, opon<8.785 county :cla, cor, dub, lef.gal, lei.otf, tip, wes cl, bal<50.35 \ county:cla, cor, dub, (6f, gal, ker, lim, lou, may, ot(.ro3, wes counlv:ker, lao.lim, lou, may, mea, fOS, weV cl.bal>50, 35 county:der.lao, lei, mea.tip.we« cl.bak162.23 \ county:da, der, dub, (ef, gal, lao, may, mea cl.bal<46V55 / ci.bal>162.23 county:cor.k6r, lei.Hm, oft, ros, lip, wes / cl.bal>461, 55 district:3c, 3d, 3e, 4b, 4c, 5c, 5e, dt, lj districl:4d, 4f, 5d, bk.ml, nj, olh, us, ut county:fer,gal,lou,rnay county:cla,cor,dL(b,lim,otf,ros,wes into a training sample, which generates a tree whose classificatory power is then measured on a separate testing sample. Adding extra node.s initially reduces misciassification rate in the second sample until, as overfitted naies are added, the misciassification rate starts to rise. Alternatively a cross-validation procedure (Breiman et al., 1984 pp. 59-81) can be used where subsets of observations are used in tum to fit the tree, which is then tested on the remaining observations. Both approaches were tried here and, based on misclassification rates, suggested the trees with approximately 16 terminal nodes that are reported here. These trees have a misclassification rate of 22 percent tor 1854 and 25 percent for 1857. While the relative importance of each split is indicated by its position in the classification tree, it is not evident from Figures 4 and 5 how much each split contributes to the reduction of the misclassification rate. This is shown in Figure 6 where the amount by which each split improves the fit of the tree is proportionate to the length of the branches beneath it. While county of origin is the most important split for both trees. Figure 6 shows that county has much greater classificatory power for the major panic of 1857 compared with the smaller run in 1854.
Given that county of origin is the most important determinant of panicking, does it follow that social networks are influencing individual behavior, or is county of origin merely proxying for some omitted individual characteristic such as education or previous experience with banks? While individual education is likely to be captured by the occupation and bank-balance variables, region of origin may determine the economic sophistication of recent immigrants. In terms of economic development, regions of nineteenth-century Ireland can be ranked Eastern Ulster, Leinster, Munster, and Connacht and Western Ulster. While the importance of the Ulster variable in tbe logistic regressions in Table 4 might suggest that economic sophistication of Ulster depositors is what deters them from panicking, looking at Table 5 and the classification trees we can see that most Ulster depositors came from poorer western counties rather than the industrialized east. In particular, few depositors from very poor northwestern counties, such as Sligo and Donegal, panicked; while depositors who had come from more prosperous eastern counties, such as Dublin, Meath, and Wexford, showed a strong tendency to panic.
Few of the EISB"s depositors are likely to have had previous contact with banks in Ireland, where joint-stock commercial banking relied almo.st exclusively on a professional and business clientele. While Ireland did have a trustee savings-bank movement dating from 1815, its scale was tiny: only 90,000 depositors out of a population of about 8.5 million on the eve of the Great Famine (1845-1850), compared with nearly 70,000 depositors in New York City alone in 1850 (Olmstead, 1976 pp. 157-61; 6 Grada, 1994 pp. 138-42) . Irish savings banks catered to a disproportionately urban clientele, and the overwhelmingly rural background of Irish emigrants means that few of those who opened accounts in New York can have previously held accounts in an Irish savings bank. The possibility that some EISB depositors from Dublin and Kerry were acting on recollections of the well-publicized frauds that affected savings banks in Dublin, Tralee, and Killamey in 1848 cannot be ruled out, although arguably such memories would have deterred them from opening an account in thefirstplace(R.D.C. Black, 1960 pp. 152-53; 6 Grada, 1999 pp. 54, 155-56) . Do social networks affect the timing of panicking? Each of the panics here spanned tbree weeks. In 1854, 60 percent of panickers left in the first week, 26 percent in the second, and 14 percent in the third week (forgoing a half year's interest payment of 3 percent); while in 1857. 24 percent left in the first week, 37 percent in the second, and 39 percent on the first two days of the third week, before withdrawals were restricted. Using a classification tree to determine wbat week tbe account was closed, for 1854. district of residence was tbe most important determinant of timing, but has a high error rate. For 1857 bowever, tbere is a clear difference in timing of closure by county of origin: panickers in the first week tended to be from Clare, Derry, Donegal, Tipperary. and Westmeath: wbereas panickers in the tbird week tended to be from Fermanagh. Kerry. Longford. Meath. and Sligo.
It might be expected that the effect of county of origin on bebavior would diminish the longer the depositor had lived in America and formed otber ties. To test this we split depositors by years lived in tbe United States (trying splits at five and eight years) to see if depositors who bad been tbere longer behaved differently from new arrivals. However, for both 1854 and 1857. the two groups behaved tbe same, with county of origin being the prime determinant of panicking. This failure to assimilate reflects tbe social isolation of these immigrants: in general. wealthier Irish immigrants left New York rapidly for cities with greater economic opportunities; tbose remaining were the poorest and least skilled (Joseph P. Ferrie, 1999 pp. 47-50) .
IV. Conclusion
To test whether social contagion helps to propagate panics in Hnancial markets we need to identify the informational networks of market participants. In this paper we were able to do tbis by looking at a distinctive group of depositors: Irish immigrants living in New York in the t850's. As immigrants, tbeir social networks reflected two interrelated facts about their lives: where tbey bad come from in Ireland and where they lived in New York.
When we examined the behavior of these depositors in the panics of 1854 and 1857. we found tbat whether an individual panicked or not depended strongly on bow long they bad lived in America, and how long tbey had been with the bank. The most important factor in whether they panicked, however, was county of origin. Depositors from one set of counties tended to close their accounts in both panics, while otherwise identical individuals from other counties tended to stay witb tbe bank. Our results show that individual behavior depends not only on private information but on access to the information and opinions of other group members, and raises the possibility tbat a handful of influential individuals can have a lot of power over group opinion.
